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INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on the effects of the'World Tiade Center terrorist anacks
on Canadian immigration and refugee policy. After a glimpse at shifts in
media coverage and public attitudes, and an examination of the impact on
domestic human rights issues and the process of economic integration of
Canada and the United States, this article will zero in on the security issue
and its impact on immigration and refugee issues.
MEDAAND PUBLIC OPINION
Though the 9/11 terroriscs evidendy encered the Unircd States legdly as visa
srudents and not as immigrants or even refugee claimants, and a few had
resided there for some years, according to a nadonwide poll in rhe U.S., rwo-
thirds of those polled (680/o) strongly agreed that enforcement of immigration
laws and the border has been too lax and that not enough was being done ro
control the border and vet prospective immigrants, thus allowing terroris$ ro
enter the country easily. The weak link thesis often focused on Canada. D.L.
Brown conjoined the refugee and security issue in his anicle, "Atacks Force
Canadians to Face Their Own Threat," in the tYashington Posr (September 23,
20Dl:1r3,6). J. Bagote et al., echoed the same perception in rhe Wall Street
Journal on September 24, 200L In Canada, many media reports shared the
same sentiments, Stewart Bell wrote an article in the Naional Partentitled,
'A conduit for terrorists" (September 13,2001). Diane Francis wrote about
"Our neighbour's upset over our loose refugee system" in the Financial Post
(September 22,2001). A poll conducted for the Council for Canadian Uniry
indicated that the support for reduced immigration rose after glll from 29
percent to 45 percent. However, an even largcr percentage, 80 percent accord-
ing to lfger Marketing, demanded stricter controls over immigration.
The Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration reported on
the effects of 9lll on border and immigration issues to the House of Com-
rThis articlc has drawn on a much longer piece to be published as a chapter in a book.
mons in a report entirled, Hands Across the Border (hencefonh Hands) subti-
tled, Worhing Tbgether at our Shared Bordzr and Abroad to Ensure Safety, Secu-
rity and EffcienE, with an additional subtitle Co-o?erdtion, Co-ordination
and Partnerships. Hands uses the rerm partnerships to avoid worries that
Canada was selling out its sovereignty on the altar of harmonization and secu-
rity fears. The report noted that just because immigration and border securi-
ty were being examined togerher, chat hct should not be taken to imply rhar
immigrants or refugees pose a particular risk to Canada. Chapter II of the
report went on to say that, "Evidence to date indicates that the attacks of Sep-
tember llth were largely orchestrated and carried out by a group of people
who entered the United States legally," and had nothing to do with individ-
uals attempting to enter Canada ro win status as refugees, This fact did nor
inhibit the Toronto Star from totally misinterpreting rhe report with a head-
line, "MPs urge crackdown on refugees" (December 7, 2001,lO).
However, the opposition parries in the House of Commons generally
endorsed the Hands Report. The Progressive Conservative/Democradc Rep-
resentarive caucus fully endorsed the argument of Handsrhat the conjunction
of refugee and securiry issues was fallacious. Even the official opposidon
Canadian Alliance Parry, widely and erroneously perceived as an anti-immi-
gration party, affirmed its support for both immigrants and genuine refugees.
"The Official Opposition will continue to work with the government to
maintain Canada as a nation that welcomes immigrants, and is a country that
accepts its internationally fair share of genuine refugees." However, rhe Cana-
dian Alliance qualified its overall endorsement of the report with rhe follow-
ing criticism: "Capaciry creates its own demand, for where there is a wsakness
it will be exploited. The 'refugee system' continues to be exploited by non-
refugees and is a grave securiry concern.' In other words, in borh the media
and among sorneparliamentarians, refugees seem ro be one group of migrants
that were focused upon when the securiry issue comes up.
Efforts were subsequendy made in the Canadian media to show rhat the
refugee and security issues were not conjoined. Bill Schiller, in the Tbronto
Srarof November 23,2001 cired the case ofAry Hussein who came to Cana-
da to file a refugee claim. He ditched his papers before landing at Pearson air-
port and landed behind bars after confessing to having once pardcipated in a
kidnapping. Besides Ary Hussein, a half-dozen orher Middle Eastern people
were detained: Pdestinians Mohammed Al Muttan, 19, on September 27,
together with 35 year old Ribhi Jamel Sheikha (subsequently released);
Hisham Essa, an Egyptian, detained August 2 trying ro cross from'Windsor
into the U.S. at Detroit while hidden in the back of a truch Mohamed El
Shafey, another Eg;ptian, subsequently deported after living in Canada ille-
gally for four years; Ziyad Hussein, a Palesdnian with a Jordanian passport,
detained September 22 at Pearson when an immigration official did not
believe his story drat he had come to attend a trade show, but wanted to
remain in Canada or go to the U.S. where he has family; and a Pdestinian
woman from Syria, Reema Nakhleh. The fact is, one of these individuals was
detained pre-9lll and the others would have been handled the same way.
These few cases hardly substantiate the widespread charges made by civil lib-
ertarians and spokespersons for the Arab community in Canada that Arab
men were being held simply because they were Arab.
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS
These stories raise the point that there were, in fact, two impacts of 9/11 Bill
C-36 that had nothing direcdy to do with immigrants or refugees but with
human and economic rights. These other impacts put the immigration and
refugee issue in context. In the fall of 2001, in the aftermath of 9/ I I , Parlia-
ment passed into law An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Off.cial Senets
Act, the Canada Euidznce Act, the Proceeds of Cime (Monq Laundering) Act
and other Acts, and to enact rneltsures respecting the registration of charities, in
order to combat tenorism. Part I of the Bill amended the Criminal Code ro
implement inrernational conventions related to terrorism, !o create offenses
related to terrorism, including the financing of terrorism and the participa-
don, facilitation and carrying out of terrorist activities, and to provide a
means by which property belonging to terrorist groups, or property linked to
terrorist activities, can be seized, restrained and forfeited. After passage of the
Bill, the Cabinet approved new regulations freezing the assets of 22 groups
and individuals with links to Middle Eastern terrorism. Pan 2 transformed
the Official Secrets Actinto the Secarity of Information Actto address threats of
espionage by foreign powers and terrorist groups, economic espionage and
coercive activities against imigrC communities in Canada. It also created new
offenses to counter intelligence-gathering activities by foreign powers and ter-
rorist groups, including the unauthorized communication of special opera-
donal information. In contrast with all these provisions that raised the possi-
biliry of infringements on human righa, Part I also provided for the deletion
of hate propaganda from public web sites and created an offense relating to
damage ro propefty associated with religious worship.
Pan 3 conained the provisions that truly frightened civil libenarians.
These amendments to the Canada Euidznce Act were criticized extensively by
human righrs lawyers and organizations for obligating pardes in legal proceed-
ings to notifr the Attorney General of Canada if they anticipate the disclosure
of sensitive information, the disclosure of which could be injurious to interna-
tional relations, nationd defense or securiry. Moreover, it gave the Attorney
General powers to assume carriage of a prosecution and to prohibit the disclo-
sure of information in connection with a proceeding for the purpose of pro-
tecting international relations, national defense or security. Put 4 updated a
previous Act and renamed it rhe Proceeds of Crime (Moncy lzundning) and Ter-
rorist Financing Act that provided for assisting law enforcemenr and investiga-
tive agencies in the detection and deterrence of the financing of terrorisr acriv-
ities, facilitating the investigation and prosecution of rerrorisr acrivity financing
offenses, and improving Canada's ability ro cooperare internadonally in rhe
fight against terrorism. Part 5 amended a number of other Acts to strengthen
the Security apparatus of the Canadian government, while Pan 6 enacted the
Chaiies Rcgktration (Serurity Information) Actand amended the Income Tax
Act to prevent those who suppoft terrorist or relared activities from enjoying the
mx privileges granted to registered chariries.
This legisladon was criticized because it seemed to undercut much of the
PriuaE Act (1980-81-82-83, c. 111, Sch. Ii) intended ro prorect the privacy
of individuals with respect ro personal information about themselves held by
a government institution and to restrict access ro that information. In Article
1 of the Piumy Act a government institution could only collect personal
information direuly from the individual to whom it relates, unless otherwise
authorized by that individual or under subsection 8(2). Ardcle 2 required a
government institution to inform any individual from whom rhe institution
collects personal information of the purpose for which the information is
being collected. The new legislation took the position that the laws that pro-
tected the privacy of citizens dso hindered law enforcement. Human rights
defenders argued that the new laws that enhanced law enforcement infringed
on rights of privacy. For cxample, information under prwious laws could not
be shared benveen Revenue Canada (the department that collects income rax
and the information on the income tax filing forms) and the RCMP without
administrative warrant.
The expansion of law enforcement powers to arrest, detain, force those
arrested to talk, and other initiatives dl challenge the core teners of civil lib-
erties and the restrictions to police powers at the center of our conception of
democracy. (For a more systemadc analysis of these fears concerning infringe-
ment on civil liberties, see the vasr majority of essays in the volume: The Seca-
rity of Freedom: Essays on Canadals Anti-Terrorism Bill, Daniels a al.,2OOl.)
Although Canada witnessed a great deal of formal movement in law,
there were few changes in practice. Contrast this with the approximately
1,000 detained in the United States since 9/11 under the Foreign Intelligence
Surueilhnce Act of 1978, which allowed the government to seal warrans of
those detained for national security reasons permanently with a judge's con-
sent. Men arested were allegedly being kept from'their attorneys and con-
fined in jails without proper food or protection. In contrast to the United
States, Canadian civil libertarians have only been exercised about those
detained at the border, and the number of even alleged abuses can be count-
ed on the fingers ofone hand.
BORDERS, SOWREIGNTY AND ECONOMIC INTEGMTION
If the anti-terrorist legislation raised the ire and fears of civil libertarians, the
terrorist ac$ themselves raised much greater fears in the economic sector of
the civil sociery not so much because of the effect of rhe terrorism, but
because of how the American response impacted on the Canadian economy.
Before 9/11, anxious Canadians and barely interested Americans had been
moving to integrate their economies even more than they had been. Other
than the outpouring of rympathy for Americans, post-9/l I effects were most
acurely felt at the long delays at border points for both people and goods. The
pressure to enhance border harmonization to ease the obstacles to the free
flow of goods, services, and trusnvorthy people between Canada and the
United States had never been greater, and seemed far more important to most
Canadians than the security issue itself, As Lunman reported inthe Ghbe and
Mailof October 17,2001, ''Waits at U.S. border hurting economy, B.C. Pre-
mier says 
- 
He urges PM to push for North American security perimeter."
Kuitenbrouwer in the Naional Postof October 29,200I, wrote, "Perimeter
will save trade: CEOs 
- 
74o/o say we need common security rules as worries
mount oYer access to key market."
Economic pressures tried to make sure that the Canadian-U.S. border
played a minimal role in interfering with the transport of goods and the
movement of citizens across the border. This concern was evident in the
smaft-border declaration signed by Foreign Minister John Manley and Tom
Ridge, the U.S. Director of Homeland Securiry, that included provisions for
the long-standing efforts of Canada to create joint customs pre-clearance for
commercial cargoes and jointly operated customs facilities at remote border
points. The real effort, however, was being expended elsewhere. Instead of
making the free flow of goods and services across the border easier, reinforced
security measures are being implemented along the border dividing Canada
and t}e United States. 'What was once t}re longest undefended border was
becoming a securiry barrier. As United States Border Patrol official Robert
Finley, chief agent for a nearly 500-mile stretch of the United States-Canadi-
an border from the Continental Divide in Montana to North Dakota, was
quoted in an article by Sam Howe Verhovek in the October 4,2001 New Yorh
Times as sayrng, "There are all kinds of means to get across the prairie illegal-
ly. People use bicycles here; they drive in on snowmobiles. They come over by
horseback."
Agent numbers along the border were tripled (from 300 to 900, in con-
trast to the 8,000 American agents along the U.S.-Mexican border) to close
up the open prairie and to step-up security checks at busy border crossings,
with enormous resultant delays. More security officers will be deployed in
future. This contrasts with the previous emphasis under NAFTA (the Norrh
American Free Ti'ade Agreement) on making the border as unobtrusive as
possible to create what the Canadian Minister of Nationd Rwenue in 1996,
David Anderson, dubbed "a hassle-free border for honest rravelers and busi-
nesses" to facilitate the world's largest bilateral trade, reporredly now at $420
billion ayear The insmllation of rerinal recognirion imagery to facilitate rhe
fast movement of those who cross the border frequently is being planned.
However, as moves are implemented directed at facilitating fmter movemenr
of goods and people, security has been tightened bemreen the two countries.
BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGMTION
The beginning of American interest in the security of the Canadian border
actudly had im origins when the \?'orld Tlade Cenrer bombers of 1993
appeared to have used forged Canadian immigration papers ro gain access ro
the United States, and after Ahmed Ressam was captured by U.S. cusroms
officials in December 1999 trying to enter the United States with a carload
of explosives as he tried to cross into 'W'ashington State on a ferry from Vic-
toria, British Columbia in a plan to bomb the L.os Angeles airport. However,
pre-9111, the concern seemed to be more with Canadian laxiry on organized
crime than on lax security concerning potential terrorists. A year later, a
December 2000 headline read, "President Clinton singles out Canadian
immigration policies for making it easier for international gangs to conduct
illegal acdvity in the U.S." (Sis[ini lrnmigraion Bulbtin, December 22,
2000). As Doris Meissner, former Commissioner of the U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), wrote, "Immigradon as a threat ro nation-
al security was not at or near the top of anyonet lisr" (200 I : I ).
Just before 9/11, the Mexican President, Vicente Fox, met with George
Bush to declare that integrating and harmonizing the migration issue was a
top priority for his country a view that President Bush endorsed. This was at
the same time that a meeting with Canadian immigration officials to discuss
coordination and integration with respect to border issues was cancelled by
the United States. Harmonization with Canada was indeed not a priority.
The radical shift in emphasis frorn the Mexican to the Canadian border took
place only after 9ll1 and can be illustrated by the article by Sam Howe Ver-
hovek in the October 4, 2001 Neut Yorh Times- He began by contrasting the
former focus on preventing people from wading across the Rio Grande or
hiking across the scorching desert that borders the U.S. and Mexico, to a new
focus on securing the longest unguarded border in the world, the border
bemreen Canada and the United States, againsr terrorists. In contrast ro pre-
9/11, George Bush, on October 29,2001, ordered his ofiicials to begin har-
monizing customs and immigration policies with those of Canada as well as
Mexico to ensure 'maximum possible compatibility of immigration, customs
and visa policies." According to Bush's spokesperson, Campbell Clark, as
quoted in the Globe and Mail article, "Bush aims to tighten continent's bor-
ders 
- 
U.S. bid to harmonize immigration and customs puts heat on Chre-
tien' (October 30, 2001).
On October 3I,2001, Allan Thompson of the Ottawa Bureau of the
Tbronto Srar reported that Canada and the U.S. were edging towards estab-
lishing a common security perimeter by establishing joint screening proce-
dures to stop security threats at the source. But all the Immigration Minister,
Elinor Caplan, had said was that, "\(/e need to be able to develop a network
where we share information overseas so that we can better protect our conti-
nent" in implementing a common objective, "stopping those who pose any
kind of security threat from coming to Canada or the U.S. to begin with." In
fact, Caplan insisted that current Canada/U.S. discussions stop short of har-
monizing all policies and focus instead on information sharing. "Let there not
be any misunderstanding. Canadian laws will be made right here in the Cana-
dian Parliament," Caplan said. "This directive from the President of the Unit-
ed States to his people is completely consistent with what our approach
has been and that is to share information, to stop people from coming." The
evidence suggests that this expression of Canadian nationalism had no part in
her demotion from Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to Revenue
Minister. The fact is, the Prime Minister and other ministers have been very
skirtish even about the phrase 'securiry perimeter.' Audrey Macklin, after
examining the issue, concluded that the 'security perimetey' is a discursive
security blanket, "one that furnished comfort by conjuring up a visual image
around which people can deposit their anxieties" (Daniels et a1,,2001:386).
The issue of a common securiry perimeter linked with the refugee and
migration issue has generally been traced to Paul Cellucci, rhe United States
ambassador to Canada. He became the most vocal exponent who initiallywas
interpreted as urging the two countries to harmonize their immigration and
refrrgee laws. However, in the Glnbe andMalof November 1, 2001, Paul Cel-
luci was quoted as saying: 'hs people come from oyerseas, we want to have
these common securicy efforts, and the compatibility on security efforts
would be helpful. But I dont think anyone is saying you have ro have exacr-
ly the same immigration policies" (p. A10). In fact, there have been no efforts
to harmonize immigrarion policies. And 9/11 has had virtudly no impacr on
Canadian immigration policies. The overall total for immigrana remained
the same, though there was a small shift wirhin the categories to increase the
numbers of skilled workers as well as parenrs and grandparenrs wirhin the
family class.
THE CONJOINING OF REFUGEE AND SECURITY CONCERNS
Before 9/11, Canadians had already developed a conc€rn wirh refugees and
security issues. The House of Commons Report, Refugee Protection and Bor-
dn Security: Striking a Balance, was tabled in the House of Commons in
March 2A0A. B;ll C-|1: The Immigration and Refzgee Protection Act contains
clauses related to refugees and security issues, such as provisions for condens-
ing the security ceftificate protection procedure. These clauses were drafted
before 9/11 though the Bill received Royal fusent on November 1, 2001 to
come into force in June2002.Thus, in Canada, the Immigration and Refagee
Protection Act already evinced a significant concern with security. The same
could be said of the United Stares. The Krouse-Perlz Report to rhe American
Congress on terrorism and recognition technology was tabled on June 18,
2001, almost three months before glll.It specifically referred ro refugees as
potential terrorists.
In addition, the Public SaferyActpassed in rhe post g/ll peiod includes,
in Part 9, amendments to the currenr Immigration Aa as a way of imple-
menting some of the provisions before Bill C-42 comes into effect. These
include provisions for stopping a refrrgee proceeding if a claimant is discov-
ered to be a member of an inadmissible class or under a removal order.
According to a Transport Canada Backgrounder on the Bill, under the
amendments, refugee determination proceedings before the Immigrarion and
Refugee Board (IRB) could be suspended or terminated if there are reason-
able grounds to believe that the claimant is a terrorist, senior official of a gov-
ernment engaged in terrorism or a war criminal. The changes dso implement
the requirement for airlines to provide information on passengers before
arrival and for penalties for those engaged in trafficking or assisting illegal
entrants. The Bill provides stiffincreases in penalties for those who engage in
human trafficking and smuggling; those convicted would face fines of up to
$1 million and/or prison sentences for life. Aggravating factors would be con-
sidered in sentencing, such as whether the offense was undertaken for profit
or in association with a criminal organization, and whether it resulted in bod-
ily harm or degrading treatment.
Paul Martin's budget tabled on December 10 seemed to explicitly con-
join refugee and security issues. Only $1.2 billion allocated over five years was
included under the direct rubric of upgrading border security. However, of
that, only $646 million was actudly to be used to enhance border security;
$600 million was for improvements in border infrastructure, including tech-
nology, new truck processing centers to pre-clear vehicles, and access high-
ways. Of the $646 million for security, $58 million was allocated to allow
those crossing the border frequendy to do so more quickly, something Cana-
dian mandarins had been trying to implement for years. The mosr important
item regarding harmonizing security was the $135 million to establish a new
integrated border force, not with the United States, but among the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), customs, immigration and local police;
$ 107 million was allocated for x-ray machines, ion scanners and other detec-
tion equipment. In other parts of the budget, however, the Canadian Securi-
ty and Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the RCMP received $1.18 billion over
six years. Another $200 million was allocated to information sharing, marine
patrols and the efforts to stop funds flowing to terrorists, having little to do
with refirgees. Other funds, however, directly targeted the refugee/security
issue $395 million was allocated to speed up and enhance refugee and immi-
gration screening; $500 million was set aside for detendon and speeding up
the removal process. New immigrant and refugee claimants will be required
to carry a fraud-resistant Maple Leaf identity card, and they themselves will
be responsible for covering the $50 fee. If all the security/immigration issues
are put togetier, then just over $3 billion dollars of rhe budget increase were
allocated to the juncture of immigration/security concerns.
A precedent ruling of the Supreme Court also came down in the post-
9/11 period 
- 
the Suresh case. Mr. Manickavasagam Suresh, a 45-yeavold
Tamil citizen of Sri Lanka, entered Canada on Ocober 5, 1990 and was
accepted as a convention refugee on April I1, 199L In rhe summer of I99I,
Suresh applied for landing starus. A joint cerdficare issued by the Solicitor
General of Canada and the Minisrer of Citizenship and Immigration declared
him inadmissible on security grounds. The application was rejected on the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service's (CSIS) claim that Suresh, as a
fundraiser for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was a member
of an alleged terrorist organization. On October 18, 1995, Suresh was
detained for deportation, but released on bail two years later when the feder-
al Court ofAppeal heard the case. On August 29, 1997, the Court upheld the
decision of the lower tribunals on the grounds rhar, "k is permissible in
defined circumstances to deport a suspected tcrrorist to a counrry even
though, in the words of the Convention Against Torture and Orher Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Tieatment or Punishmeot, . rhere are substantial
grounds for believing that refoultmentwould. €xpose that person to a risk of
torture." In its ruling ofJanuary 18,2000, the Federal Court of Appeal of
Canada determined that, in effect, it is permissible to send people back to
potential torture under certain circumstances. Barbara Jackman, Suresht
lawyer, sought leave to apped the case with the Supreme Court of Canada.
She was granted permission ro do so on Mzy 25, 2000. The issue was
whether the exclusion clauses of the International Refugee Convention
trumped the Convention Against Torture or vice versa. In a decision rendered
after the amack on the 'Woild Tiade Towers, the Supreme Court of Canada
upheld the right of the government to deport Suresh as long as *re govern-
ment observed procedural proprieties.
ENFORCEMENT
In addition to legislation and the back-up judicial sysrem, the migration man-
€ement system consists of three distinct componenrs: a sign sysrem for iden-
tification of legitimacy (a.g,, passports, visas, identification cards); a signal sys-
tem to detect irregularities (intelligence, monitoring and inspection); and a
framework of laws, regulations and adminisrrarive procedures within which
the managemenr system operares. The sign system is undermined by the forg-
ing and theft ofpassports, corruption used to buy visas, and the absence ofa
system of identity cards prevdent in continental Europe. On September 27,
2001, a report released by Canadian immigration officials indicated that
2,200 misuses of passports occurred between 1998 and 2000. These misuses
included altering passports fraudulendy, using stolen passports, borrowing
passpofts, and obtaining legitimate passports illegally, the favorite method.
Benoliny Eugene, described in the press as an enterprising student, testified
at Ressam's trial that he had obtained five other passports tasily' in addition
to the one he supplied Ressam, and received only $300 for each of them.
Another supplier also testified that passports were very easy to obtain and he
sold them for $800 each.
Individuals arrive at Canada's doorstep having destroyed the false docu-
ments used to get that far, tVhere are they from? To which country can they
be deported if there is no proof that they belong there? To some degree, this
confusion is offset by the fact that origins can usually be determined by the
language and accents of the individuals. But the absence of a universal mode
of identification to determine origin and rights of passage handicaps the
administration of any system designed to manage the movement of migrants.
At the same time, the only way that genuine refugees can esc:rpe persecution
in their own countries and seek asylum abroad is via false documentation.
Thus, there is a tension benrreen the need for legitimate signs and the rights
of genuine refugees to seek asylum.
The current Immigration Act dlows detention of foreign nationals only
at the port of entry but does not allow the arrest and detention of foreign
nationals within Canada who are unable to prove their idendty. The new act
excludes Canadian citizens, permanent residents (American proposed legisla-
tion, by contrast, includes the right to detain holders ofgreen cards) or those
determined by the IRB to be refugees. The amendment allows Immigration
officers to arrest and detain forergn nationals within Canada who are not and
who are unable ro sadsfactorily identify themselves in the course of an immi-
gration proceeding. This gives Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC)
the means to address identity and enforcement concerns, whether they arise
at the border or within Canada. However, CIC does not have to certify that
someone detained was an individual who might facilitate acts of terrorism.
Other provisions include intelligence information sharing. This is direct-
ly relwanr to those intent on becoming refugee claimants. For if the provi-
sions of the smart border accord are implemented, then joint security clear-
ance of those seeking refugee status will be implemented as a follow-up to the
smart border declaration. Since the Americans have an enormous capaciry for
collecting intelligence information abroad and Canada has virtually none, rhe
effect will be that security clearances will largely be relegated to an American
determination. There are other areas of cooperation and coordination
planned: intelligence and law enforcement coordination, visa screening
abroad, pre-clearance of flights abroad, and the sharing of passenger infor-
mation before planes arrive at an airport. One imporranr area of coordination
is the intent to work towards a common list of countries exempr from visa
requirements.
Already, eight countries have been added ro rhe Canadian list of those
countries whose citizens require visas before enrering Canada. Though even
with the addition of those eight countries, the Canadian list of counffies
exempt from visa requirements is still over 50 percent larger than the Ameri-
can one. A dry after Canada and rhe U.S. signed a joint border and immi-
gration accord, December 4,2001, Cana& imposed visa requirements on the
following countries: Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Nauru, Tirvalu, Vanuatu
(six small island states), Zimbabwe and Hungary. The inclusion of tiny island
states may seem odd as a link to any threat to Canadian securiry. Their inclu-
sion seems to have been motivated by the fact that one of them is rhe island
state where Australia deposited the 'refugees' from the boat it intercepted on
the high seas. In another case, the island was allegedly a place being set up to
be used by criminals to buy passpofts, and even citizenships, so the island
could be used as a rransit point for these'refugees' ro move onro Canada or
the United States.
Two inclusions stand out, however. Hungary was included because,
although a small percentage of Roma have been accepted as refugees, Roma
from Hungary continually arrive in Canada to become refugee claimants.
Howeve! a majority of Zimbabweans who reach Canada to make a refugee
claim are successfiil. The introduction of a visa requirement will then deter
many Zimbabweans from arriving, many of whom may well be genuine
refugees. Note that borh Hungary and Zimbabwe were among the rop ren
countries producing claimants berween January and September of 2001.
Hungary with 2,759 refugees, was, in fact, first both nationally and in
Ontario; Zimbabwe, with 1,652, ranked fifth nationally, and fourth in
Ontario.
Significantly, enhanced efforts are now being made on a number of issues
that affecr the ability of refiqgees to make a refugee claim, such as the renewed
intention of implementing the safe third counrry provision already in Cana-
dian legislation. Though the Chrdtien/Clinton Canada-USA Accord on Oar
Shared Bordtrof February 1995 had a provision for implementing a safe third
country provision, the 9/ll attack gave the absence ofany true effort in thar
area a new impetus. On December 3, 200I, Canada and rhe United States
signed aJoint Stattment of CoopCIation on Border Secuity and Regional Migo-
tion Issues that included a commitment to work towards a safe third counrry
agreement that would significandy reduce or bar access to Canada for refugee
claimants passing through the U.S. The agreement stated that, "W'e plan to
develop the capacity to share such information and to begin discussions on a
safe third-country exception to the righr to apply for asylum. Such an
arrangemenr would limit rhe access of asylum seekers, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, to the rystem of only one of the two countries." This provision
requires that if claimants passed through a country where they were entitled
to make a refugee claim, then they would not be allowed to make a claim in
the country of arrival but, instead, would be sent back to that country ro
make his or her claim. Few refugee claimants, especidly Central and South
Americans, are likely to get to Canada as a result of security pre-clearances,
especially if the safe third country provisions are actually implemented.
In tl-re meanwhile, the refugee categories for 2002 remained almost exact-
ly the same, with only a slight increase in both the governmenr-assisred tar-
get (7,500) and in the plan for privately sponsored refugees (ranging from
2,900 to 4,200). According to statistics current to February 2nd, 2,290
refugee claims had been made in Canada in January. Since 1997, the January
intake has represented almost exactly 7 percent of the cdendar year roral,
Thus, we might expect approximately 32,700 claims for 2002, indicating vir-
tually no rcd change in the number of refugees coming to Canada to claim
refugee status.
'We 
must really wait some more time ro see if there has been any signifi-
cant impact on immigrants and refugees.
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